I. INTRODUCTION
T axpayers in the United States are subject to taxes at multiple levels of government. However, federal income tax laws allow taxpayers to deduct certain state and local taxes in calculating federal income taxes. This policy benefits both taxpayers who get their tax burden reduced and state and local governments which can export part of their residents' tax burden to the federal government. However, deductibility creates a significant cost for the federal government, with an estimated $51.6 billion in foregone revenue in 2014. As a result, state and local tax deductibility is perennially among the top ten federal income tax expenditures, with a revenue cost greater than that for the favorable tax treatment of charitable contributions and more than half the revenue cost of the mortgage interest deduction (Office of Management and Budget, 2014) . Although numerous tax reform proposals have called for the elimination of this tax expenditure, recent policy changes have actually served to expand it to allow for the deductibility of state and local general sales taxes. In this paper, we examine the impact of these recent changes on the distribution of state and local level revenue sources.
Theoretically, in the absence of federal deductibility, state and local governments may underprovide some types of public goods, which could have spillover effects on residents from other jurisdictions. Hatfield (2013) , for example, shows that if local taxes are not federally deductible, local governments will underprovide public goods that increase the productivity of private production inputs, such as public infrastructure.
1 With federal deductibility, the residents of states and localities do not bear the full burden of state and local taxes, lessening this underprovision. On the other hand, deductibility may lead state and local governments to overprovide some types of public goods.
2 Finally, deductibility causes the federal income tax to be less progressive, since taxpayers with higher incomes tend to get more benefit from state and local tax deductibility because they are more likely to itemize, pay more in state and local taxes, and have higher federal marginal tax rates. 3 During the debate preceding the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), proposals were discussed to eliminate the deductibility of all state and local taxes. Ultimately, however, TRA86 only eliminated the deduction for state and local general sales taxes and maintained the deductibility of state and local income and property taxes. Since taxpayers were no longer able to deduct sales taxes, raising revenue through sales taxes became more costly for a state's residents. As a result, one might expect that state and local governments would substitute revenue from sales taxes with other still deductible sources of revenues. Research following the passage of TRA86 generally did not find the predicted shift away from sales taxes. However, TRA86 was not an ideal setting for studying the impact of changes in tax deductibility, since there were numerous other major changes in TRA86 that might affect the attractiveness or base size of different revenue sources, including changes in marginal federal income, corporate, and capital gains tax rates, elimination of the deductibility of non-mortgage interest, and the elimination of the two-earner deduction, which were accompanied by changes in the extent to which individuals utilized itemized deductions.
Since that time, complete elimination of the deductibility of state and local taxes has been a common feature of federal income tax reform proposals, including those from the Bush Administration's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, 2005), the Co-Chair's proposal (National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, 2010) from the Simpson-Bowles Fiscal Commission, the Rivlin-Domenici plan (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010) , and the Tax Reform Act of 2014 that was recently proposed by Chairman Camp of the House Ways and Means Committee (House Ways and Means Committee, 2014) .
Despite these proposals, actual policy has moved in the other direction, with the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA2004) partially reinstating the deductibility of state and local sales taxes. Indeed, the passage of AJCA2004 provides us with an opportunity to study state and local responses to federal deductibility during a time when there were no other major changes to the income tax, and tax policy in general was relatively stable. 4 Under this law, in tax years 2004 and 2005, taxpayers were given the choice of deducting either state and local income taxes or general sales taxes. Since then, the provision has been extended numerous times, with the result that it has applied continuously to tax years 2004-2013. 5 This change clearly benefits people who live in states with sales taxes but no income tax, but also benefits taxpayers who itemize and whose sales taxes paid during the year were higher than their state and local income taxes. Since this provision implicitly lowers the cost of state and local sales taxes for at least some taxpayers in a state, one would expect that state and local governments might rely more heavily on sales taxes as a source of revenue after 2004. Table 1 presents tabulations on usage of the state and local general sales tax deduction during the years [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Among all taxpayers who itemized deductions and claimed either the state and local income tax deduction or sales tax deduction, between 22 percent and 24 percent claimed the general sales tax deduction. Claiming rates were much higher among residents of states without an income tax, and much lower among residents of states without a general sales tax. Among states with both an income and sales tax, an average of 12 percent of state tax itemizers claimed the sales tax deduction during the 2004-2008 period, ranging from a low of 4 percent in Maryland to a high of 29 percent in Arizona.
This research analyzes whether state and local sales tax deductibility affected the mix of state and local revenue sources in the period after the passage of AJCA2004. To see whether states responded to this increase in federal deductibility by collecting more revenue through newly deductible channels, we use a 2000-2008 panel of information on state and local government finances matched to information on the state's taxpayers. Following previous studies, shares of revenue and revenue per capita from various sources are regressed against the after-tax price of sales tax revenue. The results imply that federal sales tax deductibility led states to increase general sales tax revenue per capita, and are suggestive of an increase in sales taxes as a fraction of total taxes (though the latter estimates are statistically insignificant). The results further imply that states decreased individual income and corporate tax revenue per capita, and property taxes as a share of total taxes, by statistically significant amounts following AJCA2004, while Georgia  11  10  9  9  9  Hawaii  11  11  11  11  11  Idaho  21  18  16  17  14  Illinois  25  18  16  17  15  Indiana  7  5  4  4  4  Iowa  12  12  11  11  9  Kansas  19  18  16  16  13  Kentucky  10  10  9  10  9  Louisiana  16  20  17  15  14  Maine  9  8  7  8  6  Maryland  4  4  4  4  4  Massachusetts  6  5  5  5  4  Michigan  13  13  12  13  12  Minnesota  9  7  7  7  6  Mississippi  26  26  22  22  22  Missouri  14  11  10  9  9  Montana  1  1  1  1  1  Nebraska  14  13  12  12  11  Nevada  89  91  86  89  85  New Hampshire  3  3  3  3  3  New Jersey  15  14  14  15  13  New Mexico  19  16  15  15  14  New York  10  12  10  11  9  North Carolina  10  10  10  9  9  North Dakota  31  26  24  23  23 other taxes increased. We do not, however, find any statistically significant impacts on tax sources at the local level. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we review the current literature on the impact of federal deductibility on state and local taxes and describe the expansion of deductibility in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Section III describes our data and estimation method. Section IV presents the results, and Section V concludes.
II. THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTIBILITY ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Several studies have attempted to examine theoretically how state and local governments determine the types and amounts of taxes that they levy.
6 These models generally imply that following a decline in the cost to residents of a particular source of govern- Table-2 ment financing, the government will tend to rely more on that source of financing, either because the marginal cost of funds has decreased or because the political cost of that source of funds has declined. Since states and local governments are aware of the benefit from federal tax deductibility, one might expect that they will rely more on deductible taxes as sources of revenue. Deductibility might also affect the behavior of residents in particular states and localities. For example, allowing sales tax deductibility makes consumption less expensive, since part of the burden of these taxes is offset. As a result, some taxpayers may choose to increase their consumption. The combination of both state and local governments' and taxpayers' behavior determines the total impact of changes in federal deductibility. Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) conducted early research on the sensitivity of state and local revenue structures to federal deductibility. Using data from 48 states in 1979, they found that states for which federal deductibility implied a relatively lower cost of using personal taxes had a greater reliance on these taxes, and less reliance on business taxes and other revenue sources. This result implied that state and local governments consider tax deductibility when making fiscal decisions and that eliminating deductibility of some taxes while maintaining the deductibility of others might raise less federal tax revenue than a static estimate would suggest, as states and local governments would rely more heavily on still-deductible revenue sources. Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1988), Metcalf (1993) , and Gade and Adkins (1990) found similar results. However, the data used in these studies do not span a change in deductibility, and so identification of the impact of deductibility came primarily from variation across states and across time that was not due to changes in federal policy.
More convincing evidence on state and local responses to federal deductibility comes from studies that examined the impact of TRA86, which eliminated the deduction for state and local general sales tax while maintaining the deductibility of other state and local taxes. If tax deductibility impacts state and local governments' fiscal decisions, one would expect this change would induce state and local governments to shift from general sales tax to other sources of revenues. Contrary to this expectation, the studies conducted on this subject found conflicting results. In particular, Inman (1989) , Courant and Gramlich (1990) , and Metcalf (1993) found that states did not reduce their reliance on general sales tax after TRA86, and that general sales tax revenue continued to increase over time.
Various arguments were offered to explain this puzzle. Reschovsky and Chernick (1989) argued that, since taxpayers could use lookup tables to determine the amount of sales tax they could deduct in the absence of documentation, and that the tables often understated actual taxes paid, deductibility of the sales tax did not impact the actual burden of the sales tax on the margin. Metcalf (1992) argued this understatement of taxes in the lookup tables combined with the TRA86 reduction in marginal tax rates could explain the continued reliance on sales taxes. Another explanation was given by Metcalf (1993) , who argued that states responded to higher sales tax prices by attempting to export more of the burden by more heavily taxing firms. That contention was disputed by Chernick (1993) , who found no impact of the sales tax price on the percentage of sales taxes paid by firms. However, Izraeli and Kellman (2003) found that reliance on general sales taxes eventually fell after TRA86 once they took into account regional shifts that were taking place in the U.S. during this period. This study suggested that analyses may need to allow sufficient time to pass for relatively complex adjustments to be made.
Most recently, Metcalf (2011) extended the analysis in Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) by using data on state and local revenue from a panel that spans 1979 through 2001, excluding 2000. Metcalf finds that, consistent with the earlier study, deductibility appears to lead states to rely more on deductible income and property taxes, but does not have an impact on the overall level of taxation. However, his sample ends before the passage of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, the most recent change in federal deductibility of state and local taxes.
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 included a provision that allows taxpayers who itemize deductions to choose whether to deduct state and local income taxes or state and local general sales taxes. If taxpayers choose to deduct general sales taxes, they can either claim their actual sales tax expenses or they can look up an amount in sales tax tables that are published by the IRS. 7 The amounts published by the IRS vary by state of residence, income, and family size. Although the provision in the AJCA initially only applied for two years, the provision has been extended numerous times to cover tax years through 2013, and the method used to claim the deduction across these years has remained the same.
III. DATA AND ESTIMATION METHOD
Following empirical studies by Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) and Metcalf (1993 Metcalf ( , 2011 , this study will estimate the impact of deductibility on state and local revenue sources by examining the extent to which these variables vary with the after-tax price of sales tax revenue, denoted TaxPrice st . We estimate regressions of the following form
where s indexes states and t indexes years, Rev st denotes state or local tax revenue of a particular type relative to total taxes or per capita, and X st contains variables that help explain the dependent variable and vary within states over time. We also include state fixed effects, u s , and year fixed effects, v t , to control for unobserved attributes of a state and year that affect fiscal structure and are likely to be correlated with explanatory variables.
For this analysis, we use data from 2001-2008. Since some variables are measured in calendar years, while other variables correspond to fiscal years, we align the 7 Data to create these tables are provided by Commerce Clearing House (CCH). CCH notes that "[i]nformation for IRS tables, used by taxpayers to determine optional sales tax deductions for income tax returns, is generated from several CCH workflow tools, including the database providing updated sales tax data for every ZIP Code, city, county and state in the United States and its territories. Tax information for IRS tables also comes from CCH's IntelliConnect® research platform;" see http://news.cchgroup.com/index. php/press-release/cch-selected-by-irs-again-to-provide-reliable-comprehensive-sales-tax-data/.
two by attributing fiscal year variables to the calendar year in which the fiscal year began.
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The state and local fiscal variables used in this study are (1) general sales taxes; (2) individual income taxes; (3) property taxes; (4) personal taxes; 9 (5) corporate taxes; (6) other taxes; 10 and (7) The independent variable that is the focus of this study is the sales tax price. For this variable, we use the average after-tax cost to a resident of raising an additional dollar in state and local general sales tax revenue. Between 1986 and the passage of AJCA2004, general sales taxes were not deductible, so that a dollar of sales tax revenue cost residents a dollar and the sales tax price was one. After the passage of AJCA2004, if taxpayers were itemizers and did not deduct state and local income taxes, they could deduct that dollar of sales taxes, 13 which would lower their federal tax bill by their federal marginal income tax rate, m, so the after-tax cost of the additional dollar of sales taxes would be (1 -m).
14 As a result, the sales tax price for each individual is 13 This derivation assumes that taxpayers claim the deduction based on their actual sales taxes paid, or that the amount that a taxpayer claims based on the look up tables accurately captures sales taxes paid. However, we are not aware of any studies that document what fraction of taxpayers claim the deduction based on actual taxes paid versus look up amounts, nor have we found any studies on how accurately the look up tables reflect actual taxes paid. 14 If a taxpayer owes Alternative Minimum Tax, sales and local taxes are a preference item, which eliminates the deductibility of all state and local taxes, including sales taxes. For these taxpayers, then, the sales tax price is still one.
rate on state and local taxes among this group. 15 Data on these items were calculated using the TAXSIM model on IRS public use tax files. 16 When deciding to raise revenue, states are likely to additionally take into account the after-tax prices other revenue sources. If such variables are omitted from our regressions and are correlated with the sales tax price, our estimate of the effect of the sales tax price will be biased. Thus, we also include the income tax price, which is calculated analogously to the sales tax price as including the shares of returns with AGI between $50K and $100K and above $100K, the ratio of capital gains to AGI, and the ratio of dividends to AGI.
As noted in Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) and Metcalf (1993 Metcalf ( , 2011 , there may be an endogeneity problem with the specification in (1). If states react to the new sales tax deduction by increasing sales tax rates, or if taxpayers react by purchasing more items, the fraction who itemize and claim the state and local sales tax deduction would increase. This, in turn, would decrease our sales tax price measure, and would tend to bias our estimate of b downward. On the other hand, an increase in the amount of state and local sales taxes claimed would tend to decrease the average marginal tax rate among state and local sale tax itemizers (because of the progressive structure of the federal income tax), which would increase the sales tax price and bias this coefficient upward.
To address this endogeneity problem, we need an instrument that is correlated with the actual sales tax price but is not a function of the fraction of sales taxes actually claimed in a given year. For this instrument, we create synthetic tax prices that reflect what the sales tax price would have been in [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] if the population and all income tax variables had remained at their real levels in 2000. 15 For AMT taxpayers, this rate is zero. 16 The authors wish to thank Dan Feenberg for tabulating and providing these figures. 17 We also estimated specifications that did not include the income tax price. The results were qualitatively similar to those presented below. 18 to calculate the average marginal tax rate on increased itemized deductions for taxpayers who would claim the sales tax deduction in that year. Using these two pieces of information, we calculate each taxpayer's sales tax price using (2). Finally, we take the mean for each state in each year, accounting for the sampling weights.
For our first instrument, we utilize the actual sales tax lookup amounts, which vary by income group, family size, year, and state of residence. However, if states responded to the deduction by increasing sales tax collections, these lookup amounts would increase for such states (since the lookup amounts are based on state collections). As a result, the imputed fraction of taxpayers not claiming the state and local income tax deduction would increase, resulting in a decrease in the synthetic tax price. To deal with this remaining endogeneity, we tried three instruments for which the lookup table amounts are not state specific. For the first, we use yearly average lookup amounts across states for the taxpayer's income group and family size. That instrument, however, may still change over time if states increased sales tax collections over time. Accordingly, we experiment with two additional instruments -using the average lookup amount across states and across the years 2004-2008 for the taxpayer's income group and family size, and using the average lookup amount across states from 2004 for the taxpayer's income group and family size.
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Since the income tax price may be endogenous for similar reasons, we instrument for it using synthetic tax prices that are calculated analogously to the sales tax price instruments. 21 Since state identifiers are masked for high income taxpayers in this dataset, we randomly assign these high income taxpayers to states based on the share of taxpayers with income > $200K coming from that state. We also drop taxpayers who are married and filing separately (since their spouses cannot be observed in the data) and dependent taxpayers. 22 This inflation measure is used make annual adjustments to U.S. income tax brackets. 23 For taxpayers from states without an income tax, the inflated state and local income tax amount is zero, and so the sales tax table amount always exceeds the amount of income tax paid. 24 For more information on TAXSIM, see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) . 25 For the last two instruments, we inflate the lookup amounts to each year's price level using the inflation measure noted above. 2002, [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The sales tax price during our sample period has a mean of 0.993, and ranges from 0.937 to 1.000 (among states during years in which the sales tax deduction was not available). The income tax price has a mean of 0.950.
Looking at state governments, general sales taxes average about 31 percent of total taxes, ranging from 0 (as some states do not have general sales taxes) to 63.6 percent. State income taxes average about 32 percent of total taxes, while property taxes average 2.8 percent of total taxes. About 66 percent of taxes come from all personal taxes (including general sales taxes, income taxes, and property taxes). Among local governments, general sales taxes play a much smaller role, comprising only 12 percent of total taxes, and income taxes make up about 3 percent. The bulk of local own-source tax revenue, in excess of 75 percent, comes from property taxes.
On a per capita basis, state general sales taxes average $662 (ranging from $0 to $1,842), while income taxes average $705, and property taxes average $69. Altogether, total personal taxes average $1,436, and total taxes average $2,179. For local governments, average general sales taxes per capita are only $152, while average total taxes per capita are $1,366.
The average state unemployment rate in our sample is 4.9 percent, while the fraction of the population that is age 17 and under averages 24.8 percent and the fraction that is age 65 and older averages 12.8 percent. Across states and years, the fraction of returns with AGI between $50K and $100K averages 21.2 percent, the fraction of returns with AGI more than $100K averages 9.3 percent, the fraction of capital gains in AGI averages 6.1 percent, and the fraction of dividends in AGI average 2.1 percent. Table 3 presents regression results in which the independent variable is state level general sales taxes, either as a fraction of total taxes (in the top panel) or per capita (in the bottom panel).
IV. RESULTS
Column 1 presents results from regressions that include a dummy for the sales tax price being less than one (which is the case for years in which federal deductibility applied in states that have sales taxes). In both panels, the dummy for the federal deduction applying is positive and significant, implying that sales taxes were higher (both as a fraction of total taxes and per capita) following the passage of federal sales tax deductibility. A weakness of this specification, however, is that it does not take into account variability of the impact of federal deductibility across states. States that rely less on income taxes (or which have no income tax) benefit relatively more from federal deductibility compared to states with a greater reliance on income taxes, as do states with a greater fraction of itemizers, and would be expected to react to a greater extent. For that reason, we use the sales tax price value as the independent variable, and re-estimate (1) using ordinary least squares.
In Column 2 of Table 3 , we run such a regression without controlling for state or year fixed effects. In this case, the coefficient on the sales tax price is negative and statistically significant, implying that states with lower sales tax prices derive a higher proportion of taxes from general sales, and collect more general sales taxes per capita. 27 Since the sales tax price coefficient in this specification is partly identified by variation across states, these results may simply be reflecting a propensity of states without income taxes (who would tend to have lower tax prices after the introduction of federal deductibility) to rely more on sales taxes. When we control for state and year fixed effects in Column 3, the sales tax price coefficient is still negative in both panels, though the magnitudes are substantially smaller. In the fraction of total taxes specification, the coefficient estimate suggests that the average reduction in the sales tax price of 0.01 that resulted from AJCA2004 led to an increase in fraction of total taxes coming from general sales taxes of 0.12 percentage points (or 0.4 percent), though this estimate is statistically insignificant, while the results in the bottom panel imply a statistically significant $30 (=3.035x0.01=0.030 thousand dollars) or a 4.5 percent increase in sales taxes per capita.
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As discussed in the previous section, the specifications in Columns 2 and 3 might suffer from an endogeneity problem, as the average sales tax price is (in part) a function of how many individuals claim the sales tax deduction and how much is claimed. In Columns 4-7, we rerun the specification in Column 3, but instrument for the sales tax price using one of the four synthetic tax price instruments.
29 Across these specifications, the results are similar to those in Column 3, suggesting that endogeneity does not severely bias the sales tax price coefficients after state fixed effects are included. The coefficients on the sales tax price in the fraction of taxes specifications are all negative, suggesting that AJCA2004 led to a 0.04-0.15 percentage point (0.1-0.5 percent) increase in the sales tax share, though they are all statistically insignificant. In the per capita specification, however, the coefficients are statistically significant and imply that AJCA2004 led to a $20-24 (3.0 percent to 3.6 percent) increase in sales taxes per 27 The coefficient on the income tax price is positive and significant, as would be expected, implying that states with higher income tax prices derive more revenue from sales taxes. 28 The elasticity of sales tax revenue to the sales tax price at the mean is -4.55, which is at the high end of elasticities of the reliance on deductible taxes with respect to the tax price reported in Metcalf (2011) , which range from -1.6 to -4.1. 29 In these specifications, we also instrument for the income tax price using an analogously calculated instrument. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic from the first stage is in excess of 10, which ameliorates weak instrument concerns. In specifications that did not include (and instrument for) the income tax price, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics were in excess of 300.
capita. 30, 31 Because the fourth instrument, which uses national average sales tax lookup amounts from 2004, is the least likely to be impacted by state level changes in sales tax collections, this column reflects our preferred specification, and so we report results from this specification in the balance of the paper. However, in all cases, the results across the different IV estimators were very similar.
In Column 8, we add an interaction between the sales tax price and a state not having an income tax. 32, 33 States with and without income taxes may have reacted differently to AJCA2004 for two reasons. First, only some itemizing individuals in income tax states benefitted from this provision (those whose income taxes were less than general sales taxes), while all itemizing individuals in states without income taxes benefitted from sales tax deductibility, which might suggest that states without income taxes might react more. Second, states without income taxes derive more of their revenue from sales taxes, and so may have less scope politically for increasing those taxes in the presence of federal deductibility, which might suggests that these states would react less.
34 Looking at Column 8, it appears that the latter effect dominated. 35 In the bottom panel, the estimates imply that AJCA2004 led to a $58 per capita increase in sales taxes in income tax states, but a statistically significantly smaller $26 increase in sales taxes in states without income taxes.
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Taken together, these results suggest that, consistent with early studies and with expectations, federal sales tax deductibility led states to rely more heavily on general sales taxes in their revenue portfolio.
To probe this result further, in the next set of regressions we analyze how the sales tax price affects other revenue sources, both as a fraction of total taxes and on a per capita basis. In Table 4 , we present results for five categories of taxes. Column 1 repeats the results for general sales taxes from Column 7 of Table 2 , while Columns 2 through 7 present results for individual income, property, all personal, corporate, other, and total 30 The associated elasticities at the mean are approximately -3.4. 31 We also tried specifications in which we excluded the five states (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon) that do not have sales taxes. The results across the regressions were quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those presented here. 32 States without income taxes include Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. 33 In this specification, we exclude the income tax price. Including the income tax price in this specification led to multicollinearity in the model, with the standard errors increasing dramatically as a result. 34 On the other hand, federal deductibility of sales taxes may increase the political ability of no income tax states to increase sales taxes. 35 In 2004, the state level average sales tax rate was 5.29 percent in states with both income and sales taxes and 5.75 percent in states with only a sales tax. As further evidence of this, the three states that increased sales tax rates during the 2004-2008 period (Maryland, New Jersey, and South Carolina) all are states with both an income and a sales tax. 36 We also tried a specification that included an interaction between the sales tax price and the state not having a broad-based income tax. This group of states includes no income tax states and New Hampshire and Tennessee, which do not have a broad-based income tax but tax some investment income. The results were qualitatively similar, though the sales tax price coefficients were more than twice as large. taxes. Looking across the columns in the top panel, the shares of property, personal, and corporate taxes are estimated to be positively related to the sales tax price, and the coefficient for property taxes is statistically significant, while the share of other taxes is negatively related to the sales tax price and is statistically significant. The coefficient for the share of income taxes is negative, though it is very small and statistically insignificant. When the amount of taxes per capita is the dependent variable in the bottom panel, the sales tax price entered positively and significantly in the individual income, personal, and corporate tax regressions, entered positively (though not statistically significantly) in the property tax regression, and entered negatively in the other taxes specification. The coefficients imply that AJCA2004 led states to decrease income taxes per capita by $52, decrease corporate taxes per capita by $7, and increase other taxes by $15, on average. Taken together, these results suggest that, in addition to increasing sales tax revenue, sales tax deductibility induced states to reduce the amount of income, property, and corporate taxes, while increasing the amount of other taxes collected. However, only the shares of property and other taxes changed significantly as a fraction of total taxes. The analysis above suggests that sales tax deductibility affected the revenue portfolio at the state level. Since sales tax deductibility also applies to local general sales taxes, we also examine whether similar results are found at the local level. As noted above, general sales taxes comprise only 12 percent of revenue at the local level, and so localities may be less responsive to federal deductibility of sales taxes. Table 5 presents results from specifications in which the dependent variable reflects taxes at the local level. 37 In this table, the sales tax price enters statistically insignificantly in all specifications. These results suggest that, contrary to results at the state level, sales tax deductibility does not appear to significantly affect local governments' sources of revenues.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine the impact of the passage and extension of a provision in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 that gave taxpayers the choice of deducting either state and local income taxes or general sales taxes on the distribution of state and local level revenue sources.
Using data on state and local government revenue levels and sources spanning 2001-2008, we estimate fixed effect instrumental variable models. We find that the federal sales tax deductibility provision in AJCA2004 led states to increase general sales tax revenue per capita, and are suggestive of an increase in sales taxes as a fraction of total taxes (though the latter estimates are statistically insignificant). We also find statistically significant decreases in individual income and corporate tax revenue per capita, and property taxes as a share of total taxes, though we find an increase in other taxes (both per capita and as a share of revenue). We do not, however, find any statistically significant impacts on tax sources at the local level. Thus, it appears that federal deductibility led states to increase their reliance on sales tax revenue, and decrease reliance on property, individual income, and corporate tax revenue.
A few factors noted above may have dampened the impact of this change in deductiblity on state and local revenue sources. First, like the earlier sales tax deduction, taxpayers were allowed to claim amounts in tax tables, which may have been more or less than actual sales taxes paid, and which may have limited the impact on the actual marginal burden of the sales tax.
38 Second, taxpayers were required to choose between deducting income or sales taxes, which may have limited the salience of the sales tax deduction, especially since a taxpayer may not know which deduction is more valuable until after the tax year is complete. Finally, although the provision has been regularly extended, it is not permanent, and states and localities may be reluctant to make a change in their revenue sources that they may need to reverse if the provision is ever allowed to expire. Nevertheless, these results suggest that allowing the deductibility of sales taxes at the federal level affects the mix of revenue sources at the state level, and that the resulting cost to the federal government is larger than a static estimate would suggest.
